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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate Werner Stark’s sociology of knowledge approach in the history 
of economic thought. This paper explores: 1) The strengths and weaknesses of Stark’s 
approach to historiography, 2) seeing how this can frame an understanding of mercantilist 
writings and, 3) develop a link between a pluralist understanding of economics, and the 
sociology of knowledge approach. The reason for developing this link is to extend the 
sociology of knowledge approach to encompass a pluralist understanding of economic 
theorising and, at the same time, clarify the link between context and economic theory. John 
Maynard Keynes’ practice of building narratives of intellectual traditions as evidenced in The 
General Theory is used to develop a position between an understanding of history of 
economic thought as the evolution of abstract and de-contextualized economic theorising and, 
the view of economic theory as only relevant within the social conditions from which it arose. 
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I. WERNER STARK 
Werner Stark (1909-1985) was a sociologist, economic historian and historian of economic 
thought who is not widely remembered among History of Economic Thought scholars today. 
A number of contributions discuss his historiographical position (Clark (1994, 1994A, 2001), 
Szmrecsányi (2001)) but a full scale investigation of his work, and the ramifications his work 
has both on how we write on economics of previous eras, and how economic theory relates to 
context has yet to be undertaken. The present paper intends to contribute to this investigation 
by 1) exploring the strengths and weaknesses of Stark’s approach to historiography, 2) seeing 
how this can frame and answer important questions in relation to the writings of the 
mercantilist era, and 3) develop a link between a pluralist understanding of economics, and 
the sociology of knowledge literature. The reason for this reformulation is to extend Stark’s 
sociology of knowledge approach into a basis for pluralism in economics, and at the same 
time clarify the link between context and theoretical investigation that lies at the centre of a 
sociology of knowledge understanding of economic theory. 
The relative obscurity of W. Stark as a historian of economic thought is odd if one observes 
the significant academic work he produced from the 1930s both in HET and later as a 
sociologist of knowledge. His HET work ranges from a variety of topics: from medieval 
economic thought to neoclassical theory, to editing Bentham’s collected writings in 
economics (Stark, 1952, 1952A, 1954)2, explorations in historiography and, economic 
history.3 His personal history may partly explain why his work has not attracted the attention 
                                                            
2 An account of the complicated history of Stark’s editing and publishing Bentham’s 
economic writings can be found in (Schofield, 2009).  
3 For his major contributions in the history of economic thought and economic history see 
Stark (1934, 1936, 1937, 1941, 1941A, 1943, 1943A, 1943B, 1944, 1945, 1945A, 1946, 
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it deserves. He was born in 1909 in Marienbad, Bohemia, to a Jewish family. He enrolled at 
the University of Hamburg in 1928 as a student of social sciences, and earned his Dr. rer. pol. 
(Doctor of Political Science) in 1934. He attended the London School of Economics in 1930-
1 and received a Dr. Jur. (Doctorate of Law) from the University of Prague in 1936.4 Stark’s 
dissertation was on economic history focusing on the origin and development of large-scale 
agricultural enterprise in Bohemia and Moravia (Clark, 2001, pp. XIV-V). 
With the rise of the Nazi party in Germany, he moved to Prague in 1934, working originally 
outside academia (as economics editor of the Prague newspaper, Prager Tagblatt (1934-36) 
and later, obtaining a position at the Bohemian Union Bank (1936-39)) and then joining the 
Prague school of political science in 1937. The German invasion of Prague in 1939 finds 
Stark teaching in the Prague School of Political Sciences. He escapes5 and finds himself in 
England at the start of WWII, supported there by a grant from the society for the Protection 
                                                            
1947, 1948, 1950, 1950A, 1950B, 1951, 1954A, 1954B, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1958A, 
1958 [1991], 1959, 1963, 1967, 1968, and 1994 (posthumous)). A bibliography of Stark’s 
work can be found in Leonard, Strasser and Westhues (1993, pp. 245-253). 
4 This information comes from Clark (2001). 
5 An escape that was far from easy. Being of Jewish ancestry, and also persecuted for 
resistance work (in 1933 in his father’s house Nazi agents had assassinated Professor 
Theodor Lessing) his papers were not in order to be able to leave. Miraculously the young 
Nazi officer reviewing his papers on the train that would take him out of Prague allowed him 
to go with a warning “’The next time, your papers better be in order!’ Recounting the story, 
Stark would roll his eyes and say: ‘The next time!’” (Leonard, Strasser and Westhues, 1993, 
p. 3). However his father died in the concentration camp at Theresienstadt (Terezin) (Stagl 
1993, p. 119). 
5 
 
of Science and Learning. He spends the period from 1939 to 1944 in Cambridge, and lectures 
there for the year 1941-2. His stay in Cambridge was supported by J.M. Keynes, who not 
only found him the visiting lectureship in the department for a year, published some of his 
work on Bentham in the Economic Journal (Stark, 1941)6 and supported him in editing 
Bentham’s economic works (funded by the Royal Economic Society) but also intervened and 
paid out of his own pocket (without Stark knowing) part of his grant, when the Society 
threatened to discontinue it. Keynes held Stark’s scholarship in high esteem. In 1941, he 
writes in support of Stark to Ms. Simson of the Society for the Protection of Science and 
Learning “he is, I should say, one of the half dozen most learned people going on his own 
subject, namely the history and valuation of economic thought” (Clark, 1994, p. XVII). 
Stark’s stay in Cambridge was an extremely productive one, and one that influenced him 
greatly. As Clark (1994) notes “almost all of Werner Stark’s published works in the history of 
economic thought derive from his residency at Cambridge” (Clark, 1994, p. XV). 
This is particularly true of his great monographs on the subject, which are The Ideal 
Foundations of Economic Thought (1943)7 and The History of Economics and Its Relation to 
Social Development (1944). The (1944) book is actually the last chapter of a larger volume 
that Stark wrote during this time, and completed in manuscript, but never published in his 
lifetime. Clark found the typescript in Stark’s archive, edited and published the volume under 
the title History and Historians of Political Economy in 1994. Why this was never published 
remains unclear, although the correspondence between Keynes and Stark has Keynes 
discouraging Stark from publishing the book in the beginning of the war, as it would not sell 
                                                            
6 According to Stark it is this article on Bentham that brought him into contact with Keynes 
(see Clark, 1994, p. XVI). This is also explored at length in Schofield (2009).  
7 Dedicated to “Lord Keynes of Tilton, the great heir of a great tradition” (Stark, 1943). 
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then.8 However, in correspondence with Maurice Dobb, Keynes appeared to have deeper 
misgivings that related, at least, to the style of the exposition. He writes: “I have read quite a 
lot of his work since he came to Cambridge, which is practically all on the history of 
economic theory and ideas. He is a bit too German, to my taste, in his methodology, and this 
applies especially to his big unpublished book. But he is one of the most learned men on 
these matters that I have come across” (Keynes’ letter to Dobb, January 14th, 1941 
[CO/9/29]).9 
Both Stark’s books received some attention at the time, with the History of Economics (1944) 
being translated into Italian (1950), Japanese (1954), German (1960), and Spanish (1961). 
However, contemporary reviews were mixed, with some being very critical. The resistance 
by some scholars lay, to some degree, on Stark’s central thesis, which is that historical epochs 
give rise to analytical structures in economics which are directly related to, and the outcome 
of.10 This deep contextualisation of economic theory stands in opposition to seeing 
economics as an ever expanding, decontextualized and deductive analytical discipline. 
                                                            
8 He writes to Stark “You ask my advice about a book on the lines of the enclosed paper. I 
cannot be encouraging. It would, as you say, take you a considerable time to do properly. It is 
exceedingly difficult to make even a living wage out of books at this time, and I should not 
expect that it would be sufficiently remunerative to justify the task from that point of view; 
and though from other points of view I feel we must all be thinking about these things, very 
possibly it is premature.” (Dec. 13, 1940. [CO/9/57]) 
9 All archive references are to the J.M. Keynes collection, Modern Archives, Kings College, 
Cambridge. 
10 For example, Frank Fetter in his review of Stark (1944) in the American Economic Review 
writes “what the author means by what he calls consistent application of this view [economic 
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For Stark, however, these investigations led him directly into working more on the social 
basis of theorising and knowledge building, and this led him to his substantial output on the 
sociology of knowledge which will become a central aspect of his research work during the 
remainder of his life.11 This research path did not find great favour in the intellectual climate 
after WWII,12 in which economics became a more technical and decontextualized discipline. 
However it was grounded in the particular central European background that formed his early 
intellectual life. His father was a doctor for a miner’s union and socialist city council member 
in Marienbad (Stagl, 1993, p. 199), and this was pivotal to Werner Stark’s early socialist 
sympathies, but also to the complex background of being both a bourgeoisie and to some 
degree a social outsider due to his Jewish roots.13 At the same time his broad educational 
                                                            
theory is influenced by economic conditions], its extreme application without qualification” 
(Fetter, 1945, p. 945). Eric Roll gives a more positive review and is much more sympathetic 
to the central thesis, but also finds that “its relativism frequently degenerates into 
complacency” (Roll, 1945, p. 253). 
11 For his main contributions in this field see Stark (1958, 1962, 1966-72, 1976-87). 
12 His extensive and highly original output did not lead to immediate academic success. After 
the war Stark got a position in Edinburgh (1945-1951) (for which he had received a reference 
letter from Keynes) and then in Manchester (1951-63), and received a professorship from 
Fordham University (in New York) in 1963, where he remained until his retirement in 1975. 
After that he returned to Austria and had an affiliation with the University of Salzburg until 
his death in 1985. 
13 This link is further explored in an unpublished thesis by Robin Das (2008), and more 
broadly in Coser (1984), who notes that “the Nazi takeover in Germany led to victimization 
of sociologists that was probably more thoroughgoing than in any other branch of learning, 
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experience gave him a unique vantage-point that defines the multifaceted nature of his work. 
He not only completed two doctorates in separate fields of study (which was more common 
in interwar Europe than it is today) but also when he entered the university of Hamburg in 
1928 for his undergraduate degree as a student of the social sciences, “-given the wisdom of 
the day- he was warned against specialization and he actively studied history and philosophy” 
(Leonard,Strasser and Westhues, 1993, p. 1). As Leonard et al. note “his European training 
gave his scholarship a breath seldom matched today” (Leonard, Strasser and Westhues, 1993, 
p. 1). In fact, this broad perspective together with the view of the social ‘outsider’14 is 
something that brings to the fore the very problimatisation of how social knowledge is 
constructed. Thus, E. Doyle MacCarthy in her introduction to Stark’s The Sociology of 
Knowledge notes that: 
“This [being an outsider] and other traits Stark shared with the original framers of the 
sociology of knowledge (Wissenssoziologie), Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim, both 
of whom intended that it served as an intellectual method for resolving the intense 
conflict of ideologies in Weimar Germany after the First World War, both unmasking 
the assumptions of conflicting political ideologies and indicating their truth content as 
well.” 
                                                            
partly because a high proportion of sociologists were Jewish and partly because many of 
them were politically left of centre” (Coser, 1984, p. 85). 
14 Gunter Remmling has remarked that the preoccupation of the relation of social existence to 
knowledge has to a large degree been the focus of “marginal men”, effectively outsiders 
(Remmling, 1973). 
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And MacCarthy adds “However much Scheler and Mannheim differed on the nature of truth 
within relativism, both agreed that this pursuit was no longer purposeful apart from socially 
and historically determined structures of meaning.” (MacCarthy, 1991, p. X) 
At the same time post WWII sociology followed a different path to Stark’s work and this 
strand of sociology of knowledge, and he saw the academic study of sociology as 
“increasingly addicted to the principle of specialization” (Stark, 1966-72, vol. 1, p. viii). In 
contrast Stark’s work remained deeply interdisciplinary and he dismissed strict 
compartmentalisation of knowledge into self-contained disciplines with the same breath that 
he saw suspiciously efforts to make social theory appear unrelated to its social, economic and 
historical context. This underlying consensus of post-war academic study (de-
contextualisation and knowledge compartmentalisation), became the deep discord between 
his intellectual programme and academic developments around him, which may explain his 
obscurity both in economics and, to a lesser degree, in sociology.15  
                                                            
15 An extensive study on Stark’s marginality in post war US academia can be found in Das 
(2008) which reviews the many reasons his work was and remains that of an outsider. This 
marginalisation frustrated Stark, as his work did not have the impact he hoped. For The 
Social Bond (1976-87) Das notes “as early as 1976, he [Stark] wrote to his publisher, H. 
George Fletcher, ‘I am afraid The Social Bond will not make a difference, though I am more 
and more convinced every day that it was my duty to write this book in order to help, 
however unavailingly, to combat the ideologies from which the recent crime waves stem.’ (2 
December 1976, Stark Papers)” (Das, 2008, p. 10). This confirms both the unity of the 
sociology of knowledge project with the work of Scheler and Mannheim on its social 
importance, and the continual marginalisation of this viewpoint in post war academic and 
public debate.  
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Nevertheless his project in the sociology of knowledge retains an originality in scope, method 
and approach especially in its connection with economic historiography that makes it worth 
revisiting it today. This is attempted in section II. In section III we use this approach to 
analyse the idea of a mercantilist school of economic thought. In section IV we augment 
Stark’s approach and discuss it in relation to pluralism. Section V concludes. 
 
II. THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE APPROACH TO THE HISTORY 
OF IDEAS 
 
“There are, in the last analysis, two ways of looking upon the history of economic 
thought: the one is to regard it as a steady progression from error to truth, or at least 
from dim and partial vision to clear and comprehensible perception; the other is to 
interpret every single theory put forward in the past as a faithful expression and 
reflection of contemporary conditions, and thus to understand it in its historical 
causation and meaning. It is obvious that between these two antagonistic conceptions, 
no compromise is possible.” (Stark, 1944, p. I) 
 
With this polemical statement, Stark opens his 1944 book that attempts to explain the 
development of specific periods in economics analysis (he discusses mercantilism, 
physiocracy, classical and neoclassical economics) in relation to the social and economic 
conditions prevalent in every epoch. In fact, Stark’s (1944) book together with Stark (1943) 
and the longer book written at that time and published posthumously (Stark, 1994), constitute 
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his theoretical work on the sociology of knowledge approach as applied to the history of 
economics. 
This approach has been reviewed in Clark (1994, 1994A, 2001) and Szmrecsányi (2001). 
Both authors note the difference between Stark’s and Schumpeter’s approach to 
historiography. These two paradigms of doing historiography in economics are captured in 
the above quote, and Stark is a strong advocate of the second, contextual, view. Without 
reviewing in detail the complex framework that Stark builds in his attempt to bring a more 
context driven approach to the evolution of economic theory16, this section will focus on 
some key analytical clarifications that Stark derives from his explorations in historiography 
and explain the nature of his approach. 
The first is the analytical distinction between ideology and the theory of the sociology of 
knowledge. Stark’s later work in the sociology of knowledge (Stark (1958)) develops this 
distinction clearly by noting that the two belong to different spheres of analysis. As Doyle 
McCarthy writes “Sociology of knowledge is primarily directed towards the study of the 
precise ways that human experience, through the mediation of knowledge, takes on a 
conscious and communicable shape” (McCarthy, 1991, p. XII). To put it in other words, 
sociology of knowledge is to investigate the conditions that give rise to a material and 
intellectual culture, i.e. the formation of a society in its totality. It is, as Stark notes, the social 
determination of knowledge. This Stark finds to be a precondition to any discussion on 
ideology, which comes later, and is seen as the view that members of that society form about 
themselves and others. This distinction is not simply semantic, but forms a basic block in 
                                                            
16 This has been reviewed in Clark (1994, 1994A) and Clark (2001). 
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Stark’s effort at building the proper foundations for understanding the social element of 
knowledge creation. He writes: 
“No society can see the vastness of reality at the same time from all conceivable 
angles; only the divine mind can be imagined of this possibility; every society must 
take up some concrete vantage-point from which to survey the broad –the unbounded- 
acres of that which is, and every society will therefore have its own particular picture 
of reality because it sees reality, and must see it, in one particular perspective. The 
thesis of the sociology of knowledge is that the choice of the vantage-point from 
which the ens universale is envisaged, depends in every concrete society on the 
human relationships which make society what it is; but it is not asserted that selfish or 
sectional interests enter into the matter already at the point where the fundamental 
vision first springs into being. That they may come in later on and assert themselves is 
not to be denied; but that is an entirely different problem.” 
And he continues several lines later: 
“But the separation between ideology and socially determined thought will exist none 
the less. Before other ‘interests’ can claim satisfaction, one basic ‘interest’ must be 
satisfied –namely, the necessity to live in an understandable universe; without it, no 
concrete thought is possible at all, not even selfish thought; ideologies can only arise 
where there are already ideas; but the universe does not become understandable unless 
it is conceived and construed in terms which harmonize with – which, so to speak, are 
of one piece with – the terms in which social life is carried on. And therefore 
sociology of knowledge, as a study, must logically precede, and be kept apart from, 
the doctrine of, and the hunt for ideologies.” (Stark, [1958] 1991, pp. 49-50) 
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With this distinction Stark can then place the study of the sociology of knowledge firmly in 
the sphere of social science, whereas the problem of a theory’s ideological position is seen as 
a separate problem. 
From this basis we can built an understanding of social knowledge in two directions. One is 
investigating the material and social conditions that gave rise to specific theories at a given 
point of time. The second approach is to trace the theory of ideas, as they travel through time, 
and influence the intellectual atmosphere of an era and beyond. Both layers are necessary as 
Stark was aware of the complex relation between theory and economic reality. Theories both 
form, change, and are formed by the existing social conditions and are, at a deep level, co-
determined.17 Therefore, the creation of social knowledge is both determined by material 
conditions and individual thought and action. 
This stratification of context comes in Stark’s work through the orientation of his two books 
from the 1940s (Stark 1943, 1944). In The Ideal Foundations of Economic Thought (1943) he 
investigates the philosophy that gave rise to basic paradigms in economic thought. His focus 
is on unified theories of thought that pervade the whole intellectual community and determine 
the viewpoint of that society. He starts by noting that the end of the mediaeval system of life 
meant also the end of the philosophical system (“the old cosmology of the schools”) that it 
supported. He then writes “it took more than two hundred years before a comprehensive 
world-view corresponding to the changed realities emerged. Of this new cosmology classical 
economics was an integral part” (Stark, 1943, p. I). And he continues “thus the roots of the 
theories set forth by Francois Quesnay and Adam Smith lie not only in the economic and 
social, but also in the philosophic thought of the time that preceded them: and, indeed, they 
owed more to Locke and Leibniz than to Monchretien and Mun” (Stark, 1943, p. I). The view 
                                                            
17 This relation is today defined as performativity (see e.g. Callon (1998)). 
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is one of the totality of human knowledge, and its link with social and material conditions, 
through path-breaking thinkers who epitomise this new era. For this reason he investigates 
three pairs of theorists: John Locke and Gottfried Leibniz, Thomas Hodgskin and William 
Thompson, Hermann Gossen and Richard Jennings. These pairs of theorists trace the deep 
conceptual foundations of the transformation of the vision of the social order from the 
medieval period to neoclassical economics. It is rather odd, and a recurring criticism of the 
book, that the thinkers chosen are somewhat obscure and the main economic theorists (Adam 
Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall, etc.) are less central in the narrative 
than one would expect. Stark’s reason seems to be that he wants to discover the origin of 
ideas, and the people involved at inception, even if these where not the clearest theorists, or 
their work the best or most precise articulation of a new concept. The importance of this is 
that these people captured first, if we can put it that way, the essential aspects of the new 
social order of their time. 
This interest in first and more forceful articulation of a concept is apparent in his work on 
Jeremy Bentham. Stark both as an editor of his economic writings (Stark 1952, 1952A, 1954) 
and in two assessments of Bentham’s work in The Economic Journal (Stark 1941, 1946), 
displays the particularities of his method when assessing the contribution of an individual 
economist, the context of his writings and also his influence in later thought. In Bentham’s 
collected economic writings Stark starts the three volume work by writing that “the 
introductory essays at the beginning of each volume do not attempt to analyse Bentham’s 
theories and to assess their value: they are entirely unambitious and only try to provide the 
historical background necessary for a full understanding of the works that follow…” (Stark, 
vol. I, p. 9). He notes this is important for Bentham not only because his theories cannot be 
seen outside an enlightenment context and its intellectual climate (Stark (1941)) but also 
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because Bentham was not interested in knowledge for knowledge’s sake.18 Bentham was 
interested in the social sciences and political economy in particular because it had the ability 
to answer policy and other important social questions of the day. And yet the collected 
writings start with the most abstract of topics- the philosophical foundations of Bentham’s 
economic writings, which is the parcelling of all human knowledge in categories constructed 
by Bentham and showing the universe of his thought. Stark argues that the whole of 
Bentham’s materialist philosophy is underpinned by the following psychic principle: humans 
are “a pleasure-seeking and pain-fleeing animal” (Stark, 1941, p. 57). Then the particular 
political and social issues that Bentham writes on are extensions of this fundamental position 
and the proper application of this insight. 
Thus this editorial work achieves an interesting combination. Both to show to the reader how 
Bentham’s various works relate to pressing social issues, and to try to uncover the basic 
principles that guide all his thought. That Bentham’s ideas influenced economists from many 
intellectual paths is the main argument of Stark (1946) and Stark shows that elements of his 
thought can be found not only in classical political economy writers, but also in neoclassical 
ones and even in the historical school. 
Furthermore, Stark’s historiographical method when editing Bentham’s papers, both reveals 
and makes immediately apparent another interesting aspect of his work, which is how unique 
and epoch defining Bentham’s viewpoint on human society was. Stark interestingly reserves 
for the end of Volume III (after reprinting material on the rate of interest and usury laws, 
monetary and credit matters, trade, and many other topics) statements and ideas that relate to 
the “psychology of economic man”. And although this section is what, from a modern 
                                                            
18 Stark writes “”the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake seemed to him not much more 
than a waste of time” (Stark, 1952, p. 17). 
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perspective, we most associate with Bentham as his legacy in economics, Stark while 
reminding us that this would not be Political Economy proper for Bentham,19  makes the 
following assessment: “The very definition of man put forward by Bentham is interesting for 
economists and has been accepted by many of them. To Bentham man is not a political 
animal, as to Aristotle, nor a knowing creature, as to Linne, nor yet a tool-making being as to 
Bergson, but essentially a pleasure-seeking and pain-fleeing animal, a being in conscious and 
constant pursuit of happiness” (Stark, 1954, p.53). And with this simple statement Stark 
reminds us both how specific and even limiting Bentham’s conception of human psychology 
and action was, and how central it became as a basic understanding in the economics that 
followed. 
                                                            
19 The insertion of what can be seen as the most important chapter of Bentham’s thought at 
the end of the three volumes is not whimsical, but another application of Stark’s context 
driven historiographical method. He reserves psychology at the end “of the present work 
because such passages lie outside the area which Bentham himself would have designated 
political economy, although he would not, of course, have disputed their relevance for 
economic science (Stark, 1954, p. 53). And indeed it shows that our parcelling of knowledge 
in modern disciplines, where for example utility maximisation is seen as part of economics 
and ethnography as part of anthropology, would not be the way Bentham, or his 
contemporaries, would have organised these topics. Therefore, Stark edits Bentham’s 
writings from what he understands to be Bentham’s view on what would classify as political 
economy work, not from what a modern reader or economist would find as familiar to 
economic theory. This again makes the reader immediately aware of the distance between 
these ideas and their period to the reader’s own. 
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However, what intellectual history in the form of pure ideas and their evolution does not 
cover, is the relation of theory to broader material conditions. The relation of these two 
aspects is the central theme of his History of Economics in Its Relation to Social Development 
(1944). To understand the complex theoretical position the analysis of this volume occupies, 
we need to visit Stark’s posthumous work on History and Historians of Political Economy 
(1994). In the 1994 volume he distinguishes three approaches on how historians of economic 
thought write about past theory and its relation to social reality. The first is the critical 
approach which sees ideas outside their social and historical context, and proceeding 
independently of them, as abstract economic theory improves and refines over time. The 
second and third approaches view theoretical developments in relation to their social context, 
but are distinguished in their ability to reach different levels of abstraction in their 
understanding of the association of theory to reality. The second approach he calls 
descriptive, because it exhausts itself in a description of the theories that existed and their 
social context. But description alone is not the only task of the historian of economic thought. 
Stark writes that writers in this category “showed indeed how, but not why, things happened” 
(Stark, 1994, p. 165). However, judgement is not external to the act of understanding, 
describing and, implicitly evaluating theories of the past. This act of judgement, Stark makes 
explicit in his narratives and tries to combine with an understanding of context. This forms 
the third approach, which he calls explanatory. He writes “perfect objectivity, freedom from 
valuation in the strict sense in which Max Weber understood the word, is entirely beyond the 
reach of any historian of political economy” (Stark, 1994, p. 212). What is then the domain of 
the explanatory method? Stark writes: 
“Should the historian of political economy on this point follow Scott and abstain, in 
describing the older theories, from all criticism? Yes, in so far as this criticism tends 
to subject the past to the same standards as the present. No, in so far as the past has 
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been fully understood in its independent life so that the basis for a just judgment is 
secured…..Within the historical interpretation we are allowed to judge, for in the past 
also there were consistent and inconsistent thinkers, clear and unclear theoreticians, 
broad- and narrow-minded men. Yet even here scientific historiography will aim at 
understanding rather than at judgement” (Stark, 1994, pp. 212-3). 
With this position, trying to balance judgment and understanding, context and theory, Stark 
forms his alternative way of doing intellectual history. This approach has elements of both 
the critical and the descriptive traditions, but is a coherent third alternative.20 What exactly is 
its nature? At one end it is practically impossible to reconstruct past context however much 
we try. All our efforts are bound to be modern projections to some degree, however well-
                                                            
20 A good example of how Stark utilises this approach can be found in Stark (1956) which is 
on the intellectual climate of 12th and 13th century Europe. There he describes Thomistic 
thought and explains why it makes sense in its context- and that this context is very different 
from today’s market economy one. He shows that the Thomistic view of money as a fes veis 
is reasonable given the overall viewpoint of that society on its natural and social 
environment. But he does not end his analysis there. He turns from a description of what 
happened, to speculation, on why it happened- and he argues that it is the transformation of 
society towards a more mercantile and trading system, with the rise of the profit motive, that 
made the church fathers in the 12th century react to usury in stronger terms than they did 
before- in writings of the 7th or 8th century. This analysis is both contextual and speculative at 
the same time, seeing both the immediate context but also the dynamic element that 
transforms theoretical argument over time. It takes an analytical position that is abstract and, 
at its core, can never be verified, but this allows Stark to investigate and give some answers 
on why certain changes in scholastic thought happened at the time that they did. 
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meaning and erudite. At the other end, a constant effort to focus on context will get us too 
close to description, instead of an attempt at theorising about the causal mechanisms of that 
epoch or reaching analytical understandings by approaching that period’s theoretical output. 
Perhaps the best way to understand Stark’s position is captured in the following quote by 
McCarthy who notes: 
“The outcome [of Stark’s approach] is a theory of social determination…whose focus 
is best described as the problem of meaning and the use of philosophical, literary, and 
historical approaches to study the social construction of meaning. Wherever Stark 
explicitly addresses the matter of his own methodological position regarding meaning, 
he demonstrates why that position can neither be causal nor explanatory but 
hermeneutic” (McCarthy, 1991, p. XII).  
This gives Stark’s approach to understanding social reality a particular orientation that shares 
deep links with Max Scheler (1874 – 1928) and Karl Mannheim (1893–1947), on whose 
contributions Stark’s sociology of knowledge approach builds on.21 Scheler is chiefly 
remembered today for his work on phenomenology, and it is Stark’s writings that made his 
                                                            
21 It is not coincidental that Stark (1944) was published as part of the ‘International Library of 
Sociology and Social Reconstruction’ founded and edited (until his death in 1947) by Karl 
Mannheim. A search of both the archives of Stark and Mannheim, failed, unfortunately to 
reveal any surviving correspondence between the two. 
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contributions better known in post-war US academia.22 Stark takes from Scheler’s work23 
what he sees as a clear distinction between ideology, and “the axiological layer of the mind-
this a priori system of social valuations or prejudgements which enables us to form, out of the 
infinitude of the knowledgeable, the finite and hence comprehensible universe of the known” 
(Stark, [1958] 1991, p. 113). From Mannhaim, Stark’s approach takes almost the opposite 
impulse, the inability to distance and disentangle the ideological element from this deeper 
axiological level, as the two, given the patina of time and the inescapable modern viewpoint 
of past society and its literary and other heritage are irreducibly conjoined. However, if one 
views Mannhaim’s work as a hermeneutic or interpretative method, instead of a superficial 
attempt to see a text or theory only with broad reference to its historical conditions,24 this 
opens up an interesting space of inquiry for the sociology of knowledge approach. That is the 
method of reflective speculation in order to understand and interpret the past that allows the 
researcher to try to theorise on the nature of argument and its evolution, based on a tentative 
subjective reconstruction of the social and historical context. This requires not only an 
understanding of the past, but also a realisation of the particular conditions of the present. 
Simonds in his analysis of Mannheim notes that “it is absolutely essential to Mannheim’s 
method that the sociology of knowledge treat as problematic not only the social context of the 
                                                            
22 Coser (1984, p. 87) notes that Stark “brought to America the sociology of knowledge of 
Max Scheler, an approach to the subject that differed in significant ways from the 
Mannheimian tradition that Gerth and Worlff were transmitting.” 
23 He writes in The Sociology of Knowledge “Scheler’s whole theory, … seems to us the most 
satisfactory approach to the basic problem of the sociology of knowledge that has yet been 
tried…”(Stark, 1958, p. 118) 
24 This position of approaching Mannheim’s work has been argued by Simonds (1975, 1978). 
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author of the expression to be understood, but also the social context of the observer who is 
seeking to understand” (Simonds, 1975, p. 100). He further notes that “our own historical 
position is acknowledged, however, not by absolutizing it, but by making it subject to critical 
scrutiny and open to a dialogic relationship with whatever ‘other’ we would claim to 
understand” (Simonds, 1975, p. 100). 
It is this particular synthesis of analytical stratification of concepts, together with a realisation 
that these constructs are only attempts to understand and see the past from a narrow and 
historically situated present that defines Stark’s position of doing history of economic 
thought. How exactly historians can operationalise this complex construction and apply it to a 
specific historical period and its writings is seen in the next section that attempts to use this 
framework in relation to the mercantilist literature. 
  
III. MERCANTILISM THROUGH STARK’S SOCIOLOGY OF 
KNOWLEDGE 
 
The very label of mercantilism and what it means has been in dispute for 250 years, or at 
least since Adam Smith used the term in The Wealth of Nations. Contemporary economic 
historians and historians of economic thought continue to debate a host of questions. These 
range from a discussion on whether the term has any meaning and should be used at all or, is 
if it simply a rhetorical device pointing at a somewhat arbitrary list of authors, to questions if 
the authors of that period can be properly called economists, should be viewed as theorists, or 
are practitioners, and current affairs writing merchants. 
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A historiography of the debates and interpretative lines that the term has attracted will not be 
attempted here.25 The focus would be to investigate the nature of mercantilist thought through 
the prism of the sociology of knowledge approach that was introduced in the previous 
section. The suggestion is that this approach can add to existing discussions on the nature of 
mercantilist thought and an understanding of its context. 
One recurrent question in this literature is the discussion whether mercantilism was simply a 
politically motivated ideology supported by vested interests, or a distinct viewpoint of the 
economy that contributed to the development of later economic thought. In the terms 
employed in the previous section, it is important to investigate if mercantilism is primarily a 
policy stance, and therefore constitutes an ideological position within that society, or it is a 
more fundamental view of the social order, and therefore a term that denotes analysis at the 
level of the sociology of knowledge. Therefore, is it capturing a profound viewpoint of the 
understanding that society had about itself and its social order, or is it a collection of writings 
brought together and forming a partisan narrative used for instrumental purposes by a power-
seeking pressure group? 
The different answers to this question constitute one of the fixed points of this debate from 
the beginning. To take the most celebrated example, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations 
created an unsympathetic view of the mercantilist writers, as confused thinkers whose main 
aim was political power and influence to further their own private interests. He writes rather 
revealingly: 
                                                            
25 The modern standard work on this field is done by Professor Lars Magnusson. For recent 
analysis on the various discussions on mercantilism and the different interpretative lines of 
the secondary literature, see Magnusson (1994, 2004, 2015).  
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“[These policy arguments] were addressed by merchants to parliaments and to the 
councils of princes, to nobles and to country gentlemen, by those who were supposed 
to understand trade to those who were conscious to themselves that they knew nothing 
about the matter. That foreign trade enriched the country, experience demonstrated to 
the nobles and country gentlemen as well as to the merchants; but how, and in what 
matter, none of them well knew. The merchants knew perfectly in what manner it 
enriched themselves. It was their business to know it. But to know in what manner it 
enriched the country was no part of their business. This subject never came into their 
consideration but when they had occasion to apply to their country for some change in 
the laws relating to foreign trade. It then became necessary to say something about the 
beneficial effects of foreign trade; and the manner in which those effects were 
obstructed by the laws as they then stood. To the judges who were to decide the 
business it appeared a most satisfactory account of the matter, when they were told 
that foreign trade brought money into the country, but that the laws in question 
hindered it from bringing so much as it otherwise would do. Those arguments 
therefore produced the wished-for effect” (Smith, 1999 [1776] Vol. II, p. 10). 
This extended quote is interesting because, in some ways, it captures part of the enduring 
narrative among a number of writers on the subject, seeing mercantilism as a partisan, 
politically oriented pressure group that lacks true insight on the economy at large.26 Smith 
                                                            
26 A later restatement of this position, taken from the second edition of Eli Heckscher 
authoritative Mercantilism is the following: “There are no grounds whatsoever for supporting 
that the mercantilist writers constructed their system – with its frequent and marked 
theoretical orientation - out of any knowledge of reality however derived” (Heckscher, 1955, 
p. 347). However, this position is not strictly adhered to even by Heckscher in his work.  
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remarkably claims that while the merchants knew perfectly well their own interests, they did 
not care to hazard a guess, or wish to theorise even in the most primitive fashion, about the 
effects of these policies across the economy- a subject that they wrote extensively about. 
When they did so, it was with single purpose of advancing their own interests; and clothing 
them in arguments that would deceive others whose interests where different to their own. Of 
course, this is a rhetorical device that Smith uses for his own purposes, and we need not take 
it too seriously. But what is an enduring trope of the discussion on mercantilism is whether it 
is possible for us to speak of an ideological position as more fundamental to an understanding 
of social reality- i.e. to what constitutes an insight at how people try to understand their social 
environment. 
One way to see Smith’s argument is to reconstruct it this way. Merchants knew their 
interests, and these interests (like the pursuit of profit) arise through some pre-social basic 
understanding that exist in a state of nature. They would not, and would have no reason to 
look into, how a situation may benefit society at large, as it is not their business. What is their 
business is to construct arguments that appear plausible to others that would, however, 
protect and further their own interests. How far these arguments capture an element of social 
reality, and therefore move us towards a new understanding is a peripheral, and almost 
unintended consequence of this process. This narrative reverses Stark’s order of how we 
arrive at an understanding of social reality. It starts with interests and these interests then 
form the basis of tentative social knowledge, which can be twisted and partisan as it 
constructed from a narrow ideological position. It may gain wide currency during an era, but 
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that would not make it either indicatory of the period or anything other than the manifestation 
of the interests of a specific group and its power at that time. 27 
This is, admittedly, a farfetched reconstruction of Smith’s argument, but it reveals an 
interesting issue. This is that the quote above clearly shows a society in transition between an 
old and a new social reality. However, it does not answer the question why is it that people in 
power (princes, nobles, etc.) did not know how to handle this new situation, and were willing, 
it seems, to accept the position of ‘merchants’ whose partisan interests, if not evident, could 
easily be suspected. More substantially, why was there a vacuum in knowledge that these 
new merchants had to fill with their suggestions, analysis and policy positions? Is it simply 
that one group (some producers, merchants) could see more clearly their interests, but the 
opposing group, (the consumers, fiscal authorities) could not yet view theirs? Even if we 
agree with this viewpoint, it accepts the fundamental insight that there was social 
                                                            
27 It is well documented that Smith spoke mainly of the English mercantilists and the political 
economy in England, and conditions in different parts of Europe varied widely from this 
description. For example Colbert’s policies, which Smith notes later in The Wealth of 
Nations, has a strong central government imposing policies to benefit Louis XIV and his 
expenditure needs. In fact, expenditure needs are, according to Martin Wolfe, the central core 
of what mercantilism is. Wolfe writes “viewing mercantilism as a programme to improve the 
treasury through the economy helps us understand much about the development of political 
economy in this period” (Wolfe, 1969, p. 203). These narratives do not change the basic 
insight, which is that the fundamental transformation of society at that time created a 
knowledge gap, between new social realities and a prior system of moral, philosophical and 
pragmatic thought that found this new reality somewhat alien and could not easily stretch to 
encompass it. 
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transformation that required the formation of new language and argument to fit this new 
reality. 
Stark in his work clearly identifies this transitional period in which mercantilist analysis 
developed, and speaks approvingly of writers that note the historical context. He agrees with 
Wilhelm Roscher and finds in his analysis of mercantilism that the historical school is 
showing “its best side” (Stark, 1994, p. 196). He writes “thus, where others, grossly 
misunderstand mercantilism, speak of its errors, Roscher grasped its historical meaning: to be 
the guide of national economy toward modern capitalism” (Stark, 1994, p. 196). Stark 
demonstrates how the five principles that Roscher investigates28 related to needs of the time, 
but qualifies this analysis by arguing that this knowledge is highly contextual, and soon 
became outdated. For example, the importance of increasing the mass of precious metals in a 
country – a known recurring theme of mercantilist writers – cannot be seen as simply an 
analytical confusion between real wealth and money, or between private wealth and national 
wealth, a criticism that has been repeated since Adam Smith’s time. But instead as an 
understanding that the increase of precious metals in a country would improve circulation and 
therefore commerce and production at a period in which social structures were undergoing 
fundamental change. It is this social transformation that lies at the centre of this pressing 
social need. At one end the monetary structure and the price system of the economy remains 
                                                            
28 These are “1. The welfare of a nation, and the health of its national economy, depend upon 
the increase of the population, and likewise. 2. Upon the increase of the mass of precious 
metals in the country…3. Foreign trade must be made as active as possible, for if its balance 
is favourable it becomes the most important…4. Commerce and industry are more important 
as branches of national economy than agriculture… 5. The state…has the mission to foster 
national welfare by an appropriate economic and power policy.” (Stark, 1944, p. 9) 
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fairly medieval, at the other, new patterns of trade and production require entirely new 
foundations to prosper. The writers dealing with the economic realities at the time try to 
square this transitional phase, and to theorise from what is a socially acceptable position.29 
Stark writes “a natural economy with little circulation was about to be transformed into an 
exchange economy with much circulation: thus more means of circulation had to fulfil their 
mission, i.e. to circulate” (Stark, 1944, p. 11). Stark continues by saying that from a later 
perspective30 this increase in metals may appear unnecessary, as prices should adjust 
appropriately to the existing volume of precious metals in a country, so this preoccupation 
with increasing them seems entirely unjustified. But he writes: 
“This is true in the abstract. But an increase of exchanges in commodities would, if 
the mass of money and the velocity of circulation were unaltered, necessarily cause a 
fall in prices, and such a development with its undesirable psychological effects, 
every growing economy seeks to avoid. The seventeenth century needed rising prices 
to stimulate production, and therefore money, and more money” (Stark, 1944, p. 11). 
He notes, however, that this preoccupation with more silver and gold – as well as the other 
preoccupations of the mercantilists – can only apply in the very specific social conditions of 
this transitional phase. Thus “all these ideas, however, were only proper to a time of 
transition and necessarily became senseless as soon as the development of national economy 
had reached its first stage of equilibrium” (Stark, 1944, p. 13). Thus Stark manages an 
interesting combination of validation of the mercantilists vis-à-vis their social reality and, at 
the same time, a judgement of their theoretical insight as an irrelevant viewpoint, completely 
                                                            
29 Thinking outside the box is always the prerogative of few- as the world is not populated by 
men of John Law’s quality.  
30 He refers here to Adam Smith (see Stark, 1944, p. 11). 
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confined to its historical period, and of interest only in relation to it. This achieves a 
disassociation of later economic analysis with mercantilist thought not through the usual 
channel of bad or primitive analytical argument, but because of the complete transformation 
of society that embeds their language and thought. 
In some ways Stark’s brief analysis of mercantilism falls short of the full vision of his own 
complex historiographical scheme.31 At one end he uses language and economic analysis that 
is fairly modern to explain why mercantilist thought was right for its time, projecting 
therefore modern understandings and analysis into their writings, and at the other end 
exhausts his analysis to a mere description of the relation of theory to its historical setting- 
the very type of reductionism that he wrote against in Stark (1994) as the weakness of the 
descriptive school of historical analysis. What is missing is an abstraction, a speculation, on 
what formed the basis of their social vision and its consonance with the transformative social 
period that it flourishes in. 
One suggestion forward is to assemble insights found in the secondary literature investigating 
mercantilist thought and give them a unifying framework. This framework is that society was 
both medieval in its impulses and thoughts and proto-modern in its profit motive and 
                                                            
31 This is not intended as a criticism to Stark, but more an exercise to further investigate this 
and other topics in the history of economic thought from this position. It should be 
remembered that the analytical structure on the sociology of knowledge was developed by 
Stark after the 1940s, and when he had, more or less, moved beyond focusing on history of 
economic thought. It is therefore useful to revisit the history of different epochs of economic 
thought, with the benefit of Stark’s later work and writings.  Clark (1994, 1994A) makes a 
similar point noting that Stark’s early work would have been more refined if he had the 
hindsight of his later work on the sociology of knowledge.  
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exchange relations, and the mercantilist writers where trying to form a view that combined 
these tensions. Their advantage was that future economy and society had not yet taken the 
form that it will assume after the industrial revolution. Their vision of the future was 
inevitably broader than what was historically realised- or forms the social understanding of 
later society. This allowed an understanding of the present and the future that could not be 
replicated in later periods. 
In broad terms, it may be argued that this viewpoint was formed by the following pre-
occupations. First, as Schmoller (1896) noted, mercantilism has an interest in nation-state 
building, as a new social and economic entity that transformed social reality from its 
medieval social centre, the village and its social relations, to a system that had an 
unprecedented level of centralised organization. It is not really contested that most 
mercantilist writers were in favour of this transformation, and their work was to situate 
commercial relations within this new political and social context. Their policy advice was to 
form, strengthen and broaden this new polity. Second, they generally held to a viewpoint of a 
natural hierarchical relation in consumption and production in society,32 as well as a 
particular ethical stance concerning the different parts of society and their obligations and 
                                                            
32 See Perrotta (1990) on the different discussions that occupied the mercantilist writers on 
what goods to export for what imports. For example Perrotta (1990, p. 319-20) notes that for 
most mercantilists, the exports of luxury goods in exchange for primary products (necessities) 
is seen as advantageous. This shows a clear hierarchical conception of societal and 
production/consumption priorities not only between classes, but also in what goods these 
classes ought to consume and the precedence involved. For want of a better term, we can call 
this an Ancien Regime view of the social system. 
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duties.33 In this they were quite pre-modern. The viewpoint of a society populated by 
individuals of equal rights and responsibilities doing felicific calculus and that this 
necessarily achieves a socially desirable maximum is as alien and unintelligible to them, 34 as 
                                                            
33 For example, Philip W. Buck notes “the labourers, the rich, the landlords, and the 
merchants were all expected to fulfil certain obligations to the body politic.”(Buck, 1964, p. 
87) He continues several pages later on what these obligations are: “The labourer was to 
work…the rich were to spend, upon objects which the state could sanction…The merchant 
and the manufacturer carried grave responsibilities; their function of organising and 
managing trade and industry made them at once the subject of eulogy and the object of some 
suspicion. The landlord and cultivator supplied the indispensable raw materials ….The 
reward for faithful performance of these duties lay in the station allotted to each class. The 
labourer was assured employment….(etc.)” (Buck, 1964, p. 121). If the mercantilists were 
social revolutionaries, they were only to the extent of finding for themselves a place within an 
existing established social order.    
34 Stark (1941) discusses how Bentham’s work brings forth this new social analysis of equal 
rights and responsibilities and combines it with felicific calculus. It is the outcome of a 
synthesis of two intellectual programmes of the enlightenment: empiricism and rationalism. 
As Stark notes “Bentham’s psychology is entirely empiricist: man, when he enters upon this 
life does not bring any innate ideas with him. He is but a pleasure seeking and pain–fleeing 
animal” (Stark, 1941, p. 57). The natural conclusion of this argument is that “empiricism is 
thoroughly egalitarian: if men come into the world without innate ideas, filled only by an 
animal tendency towards pleasure, they are equal by nature: then it is only the influence 
received in society which causes their diversity” (Stark, 1941, p. 58). This narrative, its 
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the belief that the restriction of the ability to buy certain luxury goods from abroad is not a 
welfare reducing outcome for society at large is to us.35 
The conflation of these two contradicting realities, the modern nation state’s economy with 
its production and exchange relations and an almost medieval viewpoint on the nature of 
society, lies at the centre of their unique vision of the social and economic order. It brings 
together under one roof concepts that seem alien to us. For example, Heckscher observed that 
                                                            
terminology, argument and its conclusions, prosaic to our eyes, would be fairly alien to 
intellectuals that predate the enlightenment period.  
35 Interestingly, Stark notes that Bentham takes issue even with Adam Smith’s argument that 
national defence is more important than individual consumption. Smith writes that the act of 
navigation would restrict trade between England and Holland (between which national rivalry 
existed) and therefore not favourable to overall “opulence” which would be maximised by 
free trade. However he concludes that “as defence, however, is of much more importance 
than opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulation of 
England” (Smith, 1999 [1776], Vol. II, p. 41). Bentham finds this argument inconsistent. As 
Stark notes Bentham arrives at the conclusion that free trade is always the preferred policy 
and allows no exceptions. This is because free trade grows the wealth of nations and 
diminishes their distrust, it improves individual wealth and therefore aggregate wealth. And 
the maxim, according to Bentham, becomes “that is it not the interest of Great Britain to have 
any treaty with any power whatsoever, for the purpose of possessing any advantage 
whatsoever in point of trade, to the exclusion of any other nation whatsoever.” (Stark, 1941, 
p. 63). Bentham’s application of inductive reasoning to arrive at his abstract maxim brings us 
closer in form of argument to modern economic analysis and shows the crossroad that The 
Wealth of Nations, as a book occupies.    
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this social transformation moved the mercantilists from ‘a policy of provision’, an element 
characterising medieval village life, to a ‘system of protection’ that was characterised by the 
impulse that “selling was an end in itself” (Heckscher, 1935, vol. II, p. 118). As Magnusson 
writes, “this psychological attitude to fear goods had its historical roots in the autarchic 
conditions of the medieval age, Heckscher suggested” (Magnusson, 2015, p. 27). And this is 
only one example of this medieval attitude. The concern with unemployment, or their 
concern with under-population that mercantilist writers return to frequently in their writings, 
are problems that would typically occupy a local community that tries to survive under 
adverse conditions. That these concerns are now mapped onto a nation state is part of the new 
social and political reality and defines their viewpoint. This particular viewpoint developed, 
at times, interesting cross purposes; for example, their attitude towards inducing the 
importation of precious metals, can be seen as both facilitating the new exchange economy - 
and therefore corresponding to a new need arising in mercantile society’s increasing volume 
of interpersonal trade - and from a medieval impulse in provisioning that suggested that such 
hoards can be useful in a variety of situations, even to purchase armies in time of threat. This 
particular viewpoint is of a time when the medieval certainty of reproduction of production 
practices together with autarchy and community isolation start to be abandoned, but the later 
viewpoints of individual liberty and market equilibrium, or class struggle and class interests, 
have yet to arise, as coherent viewpoints of the social order. 
Perhaps one of the best summary statements of this composite viewpoint can be found in the 
following lines by Charles Davenant that Stark (1943A) also approvingly quotes: 
“Numbers of men, Industry, Advantagious situation, Good ports, skill in Maritime 
affaires, with a good Annuall Income from the Earth, are true and lasting Riches to a 
Country; But to put a Value upon all this, and to give life and motion to the whole, 
there must be a quick stock running among the people, and always where that stock 
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increases, the Nation growes strong and powerfull; and where it visibly decayes, that 
decay is generally attended w/i/th publick Ruin” (Davenant, 1942, p. 72). 
Reading these lines it is difficult not to be swept by a sense of urgency, almost anxiety, 
concerning how many things are needed for “true and lasting Riches”. Complacency is not 
one of the sins mercantilist writers can be accused of. In fact, it is revealing to see that this 
transitional viewpoint does not presuppose an inherent new social balance either within or 
between states. The medieval mind, as Stark noted (Stark, 1956) was set against change, and 
the creation of this new mercantile economy that started developing was perceived as a threat 
to the social order even during the late medieval period. By the time of the mercantilist 
writers from the 17th century onwards, this social transformation was a certainty, and the very 
nature of this new social class, together with new production methods and a new array of 
traded goods, necessitated the creation of a new social understanding. It would appear the 
mercantilist writers were both aware of this, and were concerned with the outcome of these 
new impulses to profit and trade, something that they understood as it defined their 
professional lives. However, these impulses must have left them uneasy about the inherent 
balance of the social system at large. Both actual experience and religious and secular 
writings would point to this mercantile economy as upsetting a pre-existing balance. This 
creates the natural anxiety that social chaos was a future that could not be ruled out as a 
distinct possibility and as a new social reality. 
This speculative reading of their work may be another reason behind the enlarged role they 
seem to ascribe to the nation state. It could be seen as a natural extension of the institutional 
framework that had worked during the Middle Ages and, as the new social and emotional 
core that it was now expected to play. The vision of a paternalistic state organised under the 
aegis of a king had a significance and acceptance for that society that cannot be fully 
34 
 
understood, and certainly be morally accepted, today.36 This may also explain their continual 
interest in economic policy as the practical manifestation of this new social institution. 
Finally, it also defined their particular methodology of how to approach policy problems, by 
bringing together analytical argument and practical experience, without necessarily expecting 
a correspondence between the two that later economists would require as proof of scientific 
argument. This can explain, for example, Child’s methodology, which is captured, in a 
critical manner, in the following modern assessment by William Letwin: 
“Child’s method was not to argue from general principles to particular policies, but 
rather to insist that if certain policies had been effective in the past they would have 
equally good consequences in the future. He called those policies the ‘causes’ of the 
desirable ‘effects’, but he never attempted to demonstrate that between those causes 
and effects there was any necessary relation.” (Letwin, 1963, p. 10) 
That this approach sounds incoherent to theorists trained to recognise theoretical argument 
and policy recommendation shaped in specific modern terms is perfectly reasonable. But 
such a modern reading defines an approach to the history of economic thought that does not 
                                                            
36 On this even Adam Smith writes “over and above the expense necessary for enabling the 
sovereign to perform his several duties, a certain expense is requisite for the support of his 
dignity.” And continues several paragraphs later “As in the point of dignity, a monarch is 
more raised above his subjects than the chief magistrate of any republic is ever supposed to 
be above his fellow-citizens; so a greater expense is necessary for supporting his dignity. We 
naturally expect more splendour in the court of a king, than in the mansion-house of a dodge 
or burgo-master.” (Smith, 1999 [1776] Vol. II, p. 404) This quote again shows the 
transitional position The Wealth of Nations holds, both as still representing part of the 
discourse of the previous era and heralding a new age. 
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start with an effort to distance one-self from the present and to construct a tentative 
understanding of the type of discourse that this society produced and used in its argument and 
debate. Letwin, for example further notes, not only that Child’s method of argument was to 
rest “his case on fact and authority, and instead of offering any positive demonstration that 
this conclusion was correct, he only refuted objections to it. The objections he refuted, 
moreover, pointed out the practical difficulties that would follow from the policy of lowering 
interest, rather than questioning the theoretical conclusion that low interest makes a country 
rich.” (Letwin, 1963, p. 12).37  Letwin follows through this argument to its natural 
conclusion, and writes that  
                                                            
37 Letwin in his narrative also takes a modern view on the authority classical writings ought 
to command. He does not seriously consider that displaying originality of though may not 
have been as important (or may have even been counterproductive), as the proof that several 
practical ideas can also be found in texts that have gravitas. He writes, for example, that 
Child tried to be original, but he habitually copied other texts sometimes without 
acknowledgement and adds “to call Child’s borrowings plagiarism would be to impose 
standards foreign to the period and the enterprise. To borrow from old books was a common 
practice among men who were still inclined to think that old books were the best books and 
agreement with authority the surest sign of truth. The practice was widespread among 
economic writers as well as others, and so was the failure to acknowledge the loan; for 
footnotes are an obsession of scholars, and mainly modern scholars” (Letwin, 1963, p. 18). 
This quote perfectly captures both the outlook and the overall line of argument of Letwin’s 
chapter (Chapter 1 in Letwin, 1963) on Child as a confused thinker of a primitive age. Not 
only theory itself was primitive by modern standards, but the whole nature of discourse its 
substance and paraphernalia is judged from the vantage-point of modern conventions. This 
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“to say that Child’s work lacks system is not to maintain that he was irrational or that 
he merely threw together a mass of random reflections. The defect was caused not by 
deficiencies of mind but of method. The method was not even very satisfactory as a 
polemic device. All the good reasons in the world cannot obliterate the possibility that 
there are good reasons, better reasons, against a policy. All the objections refuted are 
but a reminder that more forceful objections may not have been refuted. But 
ineffective as it may have been in point of rhetoric, Child’s method was of no use at 
all in theoretical work, and his economic writing did nothing to advance economics.” 
(Letwin, 1963, p. 47)  
Thus Letwin, as a modern reader, ascertains that if this method of argument cannot convince 
him, then it would not have convinced Child’s contemporaries. This narratives reasons the 
opposite way to what Stark’s sociology of knowledge approach attempts, which is to 
approach the past by becoming increasingly aware of the preconceptions that form present 
discourse.  
And yet, Child was extremely successful in making a fortune, and was a constant participant 
in the public debates at the time in which his arguments and this discourse was discussed and 
at times even imitated.38 More broadly, this mixture of practice, abstraction and 
                                                            
narrative captures an alternative way of doing history of economic thought to the one 
attempted in this section and shows that different historiographical frameworks can produce 
contrasting narratives of past theory, practice and discourse. 
38 Letwin argues that his advice was seen with distrust and increasingly seen as partisan and 
self-serving. This is an interesting perspective, although it should be noted that any prominent 
opinion expressed in public debate usually has counter-argument, so to what extent Child was 
seen with suspicion and by which sectors of society is an open question. What, however, is 
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experimentation indicates a specific form of discourse that was coherent and accepted as 
authoritative at the time. Magnusson perceptively writes: 
“To the extent that there is a common thread holding together such texts and 
proposals – something we might want to name Mercantilism – we must begin with 
treating them as discourse(s) rather than doctrine(s). This means that what we are 
trying to trace is a common set of questions, concepts, vocabulary and interpretative 
frameworks that emerge over time. Hence the existence of a common set of 
conceptual tools and a shared vocabulary further suggests that the economic 
pamphleteers and writers to some extent at least share certain notions of how the 
economy operated.” (Magnusson, 2015, p. 219) 
This discourse united political, economic and social realities, with a coalescing understanding 
about the social order, into a specific viewpoint that this society had from itself and about 
itself. 
 
IV. FROM CONTEXTUAL THEORISING TO PLURALISM 
The analysis above argued in favour of a more speculative, and therefore tentative, reading of 
the mercantilist literature in order to understand and judge the success of these writers within 
their social context and intellectual milieu. It has, however, left open the charge that this 
remains an antiquarian exercise of little use if our objective is an understanding of 
contemporary society. As noted, Stark argued that the mercantilist writers hold no insight 
                                                            
beyond dispute is that Child’s opinion was debated widely, and in the highest circles in 
government. 
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outside their own social context. This extreme position creates lateral breaks in the evolution 
of economic thought, as new social realities produce new thought arising primarily from their 
social conditions that correspond to that social order. Any kind of discussion with the past 
seems to have to traverse an unbridgeable chasm. Our theorising is as useless to understand 
their society as theirs is to understand ours. 
This kind of relativism is particularly strong in Stark (1944). It is also what Keynes, in his 
correspondence with Stark commented upon as the main departure of how he thinks of the 
past. He writes to Stark on January 6, 1945: 
“My criticism would be, perhaps, that you push rather too far the idea that each age is 
right and that we are tackling new situations rather than providing a better analysis. It 
may be that the form which error takes is often pragmatically true. But the very fact 
that we can look back, as your book does, itself shows the progress of our science, - 
that our analysis has become more universal, so that we can intelligibly comprehend 
in is past as well as present situations.” (Letter from Keynes, 6/01/1945, [CO/9/152]) 
Keynes’ position as an historian of economic thought remains a somewhat controversial 
topic. While his erudition is not in question, his work on the subject, especially in chapter 23 
of The General Theory, where he outlines his grand historical narrative on an alternative 
tradition that unites his views on mercantilism, the usury laws and the history of under-
consumption theory, has been variously received. 39 Roy Harrod reading this chapter in proof 
noted: 
                                                            
39 For a sympathetic assessment see King (1997). Keynes’ reading of the mercantilist 
literature and the secondary literature it gave rise to has been surveyed by Hutchinson (1988, 
pp. 149-155) and more recently by Magnusson (2015, pp. 37-41). Although it may be 
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“Mercantilist chapter. I appreciate what you say about returning to age-long tradition 
of common sense. But the common sense was embodied in a hopelessly confused 
notion of the economic system as a whole. I think you are inclined to rationalise 
isolated pieces of common sense too much, and to suggest that they were part of a 
coherent system of thought.” (Keynes, 1987, p. 555, letter on 30/08/1935))  
This was in answer to Keynes, who a few days earlier (on 27/08/1935) had tried to defend his 
position on the mercantilists by noting:40 
“It is certainly not my object in this chapter unduly to depreciate the classical school, 
and I will see if I can put in a passage to make that clear. What I want is to do justice 
to schools of thought which the classicals have treated as imbecile for the last hundred 
years and, above all, to show that I am not really being so great an innovator, except 
as against the classical school, but have important predecessors and am returning to an 
age-long tradition of common sense….I should certainly like to reduce the space 
given to the mercantilists, but feel that I must give chapter and verse.” (Keynes, 1987, 
pp. 551-2) 
                                                            
somewhat a stretch to agree with Charles Wilson that “it was John Maynard Keynes who first 
initiated a re-examination of orthodox attitudes here” (1969, p. ix), it cannot be argued that 
chapter 23 of the General Theory added to the problematization of what mercantilism is and 
what exactly is its core doctrine or viewpoint of society that started in earnest in the 1930s. 
40 There appears to be an earlier letter from Harrod to Keynes mentioning the mercantilist 
chapter, but it has not survived either in the known Keynes or Harrod archives (this is also the 
view of Dr. Daniele Besomi). When exactly this letter was sent and when Harrod had read the 
mercantilist chapter remains unclear.  
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One interesting question is why Keynes was so attached to the mercantilists and also to 
tracing antecedents to his theoretical positions.41 As he wrote to Stark, he believed in progress 
                                                            
41 Keynes’ own opinion of the mercantilists changed over time. He acknowledges this himself 
in pages 333-5 of The General Theory, where he writes that his earlier opinion was 
influenced by the “classical” tradition of interpreting these texts, which, from his current 
(General Theory period) perspective misunderstood the “real substance of the mercantilist 
case” (Keynes, 1936, p. 334). The intellectual path of Keynes, to which his opinion and use 
of mercantilism was a minor part, is too broad a topic to cover in this paper, but it may be 
worth noting the following that relates directly to Stark’s historiographical position. This is 
Keynes’ conception of the relation between individual and society. As Davis (1994) notes 
Keynes’ views on the individual and their relation to others as well as his view of what 
constitutes social context changed substantially from his earlier beliefs to the period of The 
General Theory. Keynes believed that “ideas in the abstract… constitute the common ground 
for the relationships between individuals” (Davis, 1994, pp. 111-112). In this way, “shared 
abstract ideas, it might be said, are the substance of social relationships” (Davis, 1994, p. 
112). But these abstract ideas came, with time,  to be conceived by Keynes less as atemporal 
ideal forms that exist naturally to individuals and more as a “mutual dependence of individual 
belief expectations” which depended on “conventions and rules in the economy” (Davis, 
1994, p. 115). This conception of the economy comes very close to Stark’s own view of how 
ideas constitute an intellectual milieu at a particular point in time and form together with 
material realities the different sides of social existence. In Stark’ terminology, these ideas are 
part of the axiological layer of the mind. This further shows the concordance between Stark’s 
work and the philosophical and ontological underpinnings of Keynes’ later economic 
writings. 
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in economic thought, and yet, this was not the usual linear progress where new theories 
overtake old ones. In fact, the whole of The General Theory is constructed on a narrative that 
partly, purportedly, attempts to resurrect ideas from Malthus and other writers lost in the 
mists of time, but which hold relevance over existing orthodoxy. 
Therefore, the contrast between these two positions allows us to construct an alternative basis 
that grounds Keynes’ understanding of the uses of past theory and discourse. In chapter 23 of 
the General Theory he starts by originally defining mercantilism as the opinion “that there is 
a peculiar advantage to a country in a favourable balance of trade, and grave danger in an 
unfavourable balance, particularly if it results in an efflux of precious metals” (Keynes, 1936, 
p. 333). A few lines later he adds that “it will be convenient, in accordance with tradition, to 
designate the older opinion as mercantilism, and the newer as free trade, though these terms, 
since each of them has both a broader and a narrower signification, must be interpreted with 
reference to the context” (stress in original, Keynes, 1936, p. 333). This qualification is 
important not only because Keynes immediately introduces context as an important element 
when discussing abstract theoretical positions and broad constructs (like the concept of 
mercantilism), but also because he soon evolves this definition by arguing that mercantilists 
held more complex views than what is traditionally ascribed to them, and understood an array 
of real world problems from a variety of policy perspectives. The whole narrative of the 
chapter is constructed around the axis of mercantilists and then later writers whose core view 
of the economy was antagonised by the classical school of economics, versus the classical 
school itself.42 Keynes rephrases mercantilist arguments into the language of The General 
Theory and finds correspondence of their views with his, when transferred into modern 
                                                            
42 I use this term as it is defined in The General Theory- which includes the orthodox 
classical and neoclassical writers of the previous eras of economic theory.  
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parlance.43 Furthermore, he does not intend to entirely disregard analytical findings which are 
identified with the classical school, and for example, he writes “the advantages of the 
international division of labour are real and substantial, even though the classical school 
greatly overstressed them” (Keynes, 1936, p. 338) and at the same time cautions that the 
mercantilists did not always advocate trade restrictions, and therefore, “the reader must not 
reach a premature conclusion to the practical policy to which our argument leads up” (Italics 
in original, Keynes, 1936, p. 338). 
The reader senses that Keynes does not question the analytical superiority of the classical 
economists over the mercantilists, but their practical relevance. The real question is, if the 
                                                            
43 For example, he writes that “if the wage unit is somewhat stable…., if the state of liquidity-
preference is somewhat stable,…., and if banking conventions are also stable, the rate of 
interest will be governed by the quantity of the precious metals, measured in terms of the 
wage-unit, available to satisfy the community’s desire for liquidity” (Keynes, 1936, p. 336). 
This example shows that Keynes uses the terminology of the General Theory to derive a 
conclusion which he finds to be close, in form and substance, to what the mercantilist writers 
where arguing. He goes on to note that “in an age in which substantial foreign loans and the 
outright ownership of wealth located abroad are scarcely practicable, increases and decreases 
in the quantity of precious metals will largely depend on whether the balance of trade is 
favourable or unfavourable” (Keynes, 1936, p. 336). Thus, Keynes starting from his 
framework, not only nests some of the theoretical conclusions of the mercantilists as 
reasonable conclusions under conditions in his scheme, but also explains why, given the 
historical context, these writers where so preoccupied with a country’s terms of trade. A 
preoccupation that later economists explained as a theoretical weakness and Keynes as an 
outcome of their method and socioeconomic context.  
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classical school is starting from this superior ground of theoretical clarity, why not extend it 
to encompass these policy questions and instead argue that the very nature of classical 
analysis did not allow these questions to be meaningfully asked? 
A usual answer to this question is that Keynes was employing a rhetorical device to highlight 
his own contributions to economic theory. The implicit argument is that economic theory 
evolves and extends to new analytical domains as more theoretical findings are added to this 
approach and fine-tune its relation between theory, policy and economic reality. However, 
starting from Stark’s historiographic framework, we may tentatively argue that Keynes’ 
narrative is following another path, which is that these theoretical paradigms are constituted 
around different core visions of economy and society and therefore lead to different ways of 
doing economics.44 Furthermore, these core visions employ a different kind of discourse that 
                                                            
44 Keynes makes a direct reference that supports this reading of his narrative. He writes, for 
example, in relation to Locke “Locke explains that money has two values: (1) its value in use 
which is given by the rate of interest… and (2) its value in exchange” and from this Keynes 
deduces that Locke was “standing with one foot in the mercantilist world and with one foot in 
the classical world” (Keynes, 1936, p. 343). Thus Locke occupied this transitional period 
between the realities of the mercantilist period, and the economy of the classical era, and 
theorised accordingly. He writes on Hume that he “had a foot and a half in the classical 
world” noting that “Hume began the practice among economists of stressing the importance 
of the equilibrium position as compared with the ever-shifting transition toward it, though he 
was still enough of a mercantilist not to overlook the fact that it is in the transition that we 
actually have our being” (Keynes, 1936, p. 343). Keynes notes that Hume came “a little later” 
than Locke, and therefore occupies a different time. He employs similar language in the 
correspondence with Harrod on the exchange over the classical authors and their 
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is related to the particular literature this society comes up with. If one sees the past though 
this lens, one can argue that Keynes found in the mercantilists a social vision that was akin to 
his own. From this base he intended to extend their framework by adding theoretical clarity 
and updating it in a variety of ways that would suit his modern needs.45 
What is this vision? For Keynes of The General Theory it seems to be the fact that there is no 
natural tendency of the economic system to balance itself. For example he writes that 
“Mercantilists’ thought never supposed that there was a self-adjusting tendency by which the 
rate of interest would be established at the appropriate level” (Keynes, 1936, p. 341). He also 
                                                            
interpretation vis-à-vis The General Theory. In the same letter to Harrod that I quote above 
Keynes writes “my own firm conviction is that your mind is still half in the classical world, 
and that you ought to be accusing me, not of bad manners, but of faulty theory” (Keynes, 
1987, p. 551). Keynes is chiding Harrod that he is not seeing his way of doing economics and 
even implicitly insinuating that Harrod is not moving forward with the times.  
45 In a letter to Harrod on 3 August 1938 where they are discussing the celebrated debate 
between Tinbergen and Keynes, Keynes stresses that economics is a moral science instead of 
a natural one (he noted this also on another letter to Harrod on the 4rth of July, 1938). On the 
3rd of August letter he adds “one has to constantly guard against treating the material as 
constant and homogeneous” (Keynes, 1987A, p. 300). Thus the economist, by means of 
introspection, tries to understand and constantly update whatever tools they are using to serve 
present purposes. Social reality over time is neither constant nor homogeneous, nor does it 
change in a predetermined and predictable fashion. For this reason the association of current 
theory with past theory and social reality past and present is a complex question that involves 
judgement on the part of the economist, and is bound to be to some extent a personal choice 
that suits specific purposes. 
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notes the centrality of the problem of full employment by mercantilist writers, who did not 
presuppose that the system would reach equilibrium, but could instead have chronic 
underemployment due to monetary conditions. He notes that “there was wisdom in their 
intense preoccupation with keeping down the rate of interest,… by maintaining the domestic 
stock of money and by discouraging rises in the wage-unit….” (Keynes, 1936, p.  240). 
Therefore, Keynes finds a significant relation with what he perceives to be the underlying 
systemic vision of society of these writings and his own,46 but he also finds that alternative 
traditions in economics construct economic knowledge in different ways. For example 
Keynes notes that the mercantilists “were under no illusions as to the nationalistic character 
of their policies and their tendency to promote war” (Keynes, 1936, p. 348). They were fully 
aware of the normative nature of their theoretical and policy positions, and did not eschew the 
political and moral ramifications of their analysis, even if this was, at times, unpalatable. 
Keynes finds this mind-frame more useful than what he perceives as the opposite which he 
calls “the confused thinking of contemporary advocates of an international fixed gold 
standard and laissez-faire in international lending, who believe that it is precisely these 
policies which will best promote peace” (Keynes, 1936, p. 348). Thus, in Keynes’ view as 
expressed in The General Theory, there is no piece of technical analysis that stands outside 
moral and political context and is an analytical truth that leads to unqualified policy 
prescriptions. Free trade has moral, political, distributional and socially transformative effects 
                                                            
46 In Keynes’ own words “as a contribution to statecraft, which is concerned with the 
economic system as a whole and with securing the optimum employment of the system’s 
entire resources, the methods of the early pioneers of economic thinking in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries may have attained to fragments of practical wisdom which the 
unrealistic abstractions of Ricardo first forgot and then obliterated.” (Keynes, 1936, p. 340). 
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that cannot be ignored, or discounted as irrelevant to the economic argument. Therefore, 
these different overarching narratives of social reality (mercantilism and the classical system) 
have each their own strengths and weaknesses, and this leads to a more complex 
understanding of past theory to readings that focus only on technical refinements of abstract 
argument over time. 
These differences of understanding of social reality at large, are to Keynes more central than 
the analytical refinements of later eras. Instead, he sees these technical refinements as being 
able to be grafted onto the mercantilist general vision of society and economy. He writes: 
“The mercantilists perceived the existence of the problem without being able to push 
their analysis to the point of solving it. But the classical school ignored the problem, 
as a consequence of introducing into their premises conditions which involved its 
non-existence; with the result of creating a cleavage between the conclusions of 
economic theory and those of common sense” (Keynes, 1936, p. 350). 
This allows an extension of the sociology of knowledge historiographic view into new 
directions. Instead of seeing the past as a corpus of theory and social reality that is only of 
antiquarian interest, it can be seen as a library of alternative visions of the social order that 
the modern theorist can try to access through study of their context, language and theory, and 
in this way attempt to see if the vision has something of value for understanding today’s 
reality. This attempt to access another universe of perspectives allows a very deep kind of 
pluralism that is delineated by history, its literature and our ability to conceptually and 
practically access it. In this way, Stark’s sociology of knowledge historical approach becomes 
a hermeneutic tool of past text and its context. It also gives the history of economic thought a 
place in modern theorising that is both unique and vital, as it keeps the theorist returning to 
the very nature of their fundamental and historically situated viewpoint of society. This 
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allows the theorist to explore anew what are the constitutive elements of their social vision 
and renew their perspective if a perceived dissonance between reality and theory develops. 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
“Mercantilism never existed in the sense that Colbert or Cromwell existed. It is only 
an instrumental concept which, if aptly chosen, should enable us to understand a 
particular historical period more clearly than we otherwise might.” (Heckscher, 1935, 
p. 19) 
This paper’s intension was to first explore in depth the meaning of using instrumental 
concepts for understanding a past period of economic and social history through the lens of 
their own theorising, and second by turning the lens to our own economy and society to see if 
we can use it to illuminate unexplored or underexplored parts of our reality. 
The central reason for attempting this archaeology of theory is because looking at the past 
offers viewpoints that not only do not exist today, but cannot arise today unless that process 
starts through a historical investigation. This is because both the social and intellectual 
context of modern theory is already formed at an elemental level, and it is based on an 
understanding of society that defines our thought. In other words, the general vision of 
society has already been set and, this setting may allow different social understandings and 
ideological positions, but these cannot extend beyond the limits set by our own social and 
intellectual reality- by the imagination of the present.47 
                                                            
47 Iara Vigo de Lima makes this point in her work on Foucault’s Archaeology of Political 
Economy, where she notes “the knowledge of our past can enhance the level of consciousness 
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In our own struggle to escape from ideas that ramify every corner of our minds, texts from 
the past and the effort to understand their context allows the opening of vistas that would be 
closed to us otherwise. Boulding (1971) calls this “the principle of the extended present” by 
arguing that that great writers of the past need to be studied “from the point of view of what 
they have to say to us today” (Boulding, 1971, p. 234). Boulding implicitly argues that texts 
are, to some extent, vessels of their context, and as such embody a perspective that is 
different to our own. This position, as well as a renewed interest to see and analyse past texts 
through literary analysis has been advanced by Keith Tribe (1978, 2015). Both Boulding and 
Tribe effectively argue that as long as this perspective is still illuminating parts of our society, 
then the text has modern relevance. 
This activity of modern use is inevitably an attempt to decontextualize the theory, method 
and understanding of those writers from their social context for a kind of instrumental 
application to our own. In this practice there are no generally agreed guidelines how this 
activity should take place, as it is by necessity an effort to reduce the wealth of the original 
insight and place it into a modern narrative. Indeed the activity will take different forms, 
depending what the purpose of the exercise is. If this is an interest to understand the past and 
therefore implicitly make one better understand the present, Stark offers another perspective 
that mediates the difficult ground between past and present, context and theory. Iara Vigo de 
Lima’s work on Foucault’s Archaeology of Political Economy (Vigo de Lima, 2010) as well 
as Keith Tribe’s Economy of the Word (Tribe, 2015) also explore anew this important 
relation. Stark’s work can be seen as another perspective coming from a different intellectual 
background and offering another set of analytical distinctions, and therefore permitting 
                                                            
regarding who we are today, which Foucault called ‘the history of the present’” (Vigo de 
Lima, 2010, p. 3).  
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another type of speculative theorising on the context and theory insights of the past.48 This 
kind of pluralism of approach allows more insights to be gained, and moves us away from the 
formulaic application of a singular way to approach the past. Tribe notes “methodology, like 
the philosophy of science, is too often thought of as a technique, rather than as a means for 
reflection.” (Tribe, 2015, p. 3) 
And while the poetics of this exercise are an interesting investigation that lie beyond the 
limits of this paper, one important insight emanating from Stark’s work is that this should not 
be a transference that reduces a complex intellectual milieu only to a modern ideological 
position. The narrative that reduces mercantilism to a one-dimensional policy position in 
favour of protection across ages and different contexts is one such case of reductionism. The 
problem with such narratives is that they retain nothing of the wealth of the original insight 
and the term becomes simply a placeholder in the modern ideological spectrum,49 especially 
if used in conjunction with language and theoretical argument drawn from a modern 
framework, without adding anything new to the debate. 
Instead, Keynes’ instrumental use of mercantilism in The General Theory was an attempt to 
involve the reader in a more substantial activity of narrative creation and self-reflection. His 
work attempted a dialogue with past texts and authors with the intension of providing a 
                                                            
48 This broad grouping does not intend to diminish the distance between these different 
approaches. Contemporary approaches differ in orientation to Stark’s and also on the way 
they utilise philological analysis. The focus is different to the broad epoch oriented narratives 
that Stark constructs and is typical of the sociology of knowledge tradition of the 1930s that 
forms his background.   
49 It has been noted by historians of economic thought, that the ideological narrative of 
mercantilism vs. free trade is itself an anachronism (see e.g. Perrotta 1991, Magnusson 2004).   
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radically different view of contemporary society. This mental and rhetorical trick, forcefully 
used by Keynes throughout The General Theory, intended a problimatisation of the viewpoint 
that his readers would take as natural and beyond dispute. The past was used instrumentally, 
but to great effect and with purpose, and this fitted within Keynes scheme of introducing his 
readers to novel ideas, suggesting that they need to re-read and re-think what they take as 
given, inspect it anew, and through this exercise contemplate social realities, new and old, 
that would otherwise be outside the scope of their imagination. 
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